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Introduction.

In recent months, corporate officers and counsel in several industries have received registered letters from the Federal Trade Commission, the contents of which
have generated a flurry of activity on the part of corporate defenders and government investigators. These letters contain questionnaires concerning corporate activity which are to be filled out and returned to the Commission. This new method
of investigation, being implemented under authority of Section 6 (b) of the FTC
Act,:' has allowed the Commission widespread coverage without an increase in
FTC personnel. This note will discuss some of the legal issues likely to arise from
utilization of the new method.
Until recently, investigations under Section 6 of the Act have been sporadic.
Throughout the history of the Act, general economic surve ]s have been undertaken
from time to time; 2 special reports have also been used in legal investigations3 to
gather data in specific antimonopoly cases to either discover violations or to check
compliance with outstanding Commission orders.
In 1959, pursuant to a committee recommendation, 4 the Commission adopted
a new policy, that of utilizing the special reports to conduct general legal investigations of antitrust violations throughout entire industries. According to Earl Kintner,
former Chairman of the FTC, the new method has permitted "quick, inexpensive
and efficient investigation of industry-wide practice." 5 It has also served to alleviate
a problem which has recently plagued members of the antitrust bar, that
of dis6
similar treatment of competitors which led to inequities in competition.
The industry-wide legal investigations were first used in the grocery and citrus
fruit industries.7 In the latter case, 118 companies were required to file reports,
which resulted in 54 complaints based on Robinson-Patman violations." The investigative technique has since, been used in the department store, food, photographic equipment and drug industries, 9 and, although exact data is not available,

1 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. Section 6 of the FTC Act gives the
Commission a broad power of investigation through annual and/or special reports which
must be filed at the Commission's request.
2 See 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 141, for a summary of all general investigations undertaken
by the FTC since 1915.
3 Industry-wide legal investigations are to be distinguished from economic surveys undertaken by the Commission for public information purposes rather than for discovery of antitrust violations. See Kintner, Developments Under the Antimerger Act and Other Aspects
of the Federal Trade Commissions Antitrust Program, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 387, 392 (1960).
4 Parrish, Federal Trade Commission Aids to Antitrust Counseling, 5 ANTITRUST BULL.
493, 495 "(1960).
5 Kintner, supra note 3, at 393.
6 See Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1957). The problem referred to
arises when the Commission seeks to prevent antitrust violations by one party in a highly
competitive market, leaving his competitors free to do as they wish. This results in the party
proceeded against being at a distinct economic disadvantage.
7 The grocery investigation began as an economic survey, but the information gained
precipitated a general legal investigation throughout the entire industry. Kintner, supra note
5, at 392.
8 Id. at 392-93.
9 A summary of the questionnaire furnished 37 companies in the drug industry may
indicate how broad the investigations are. There are 14 sections containing from one to
several specific questions requiring written answers. In addition to asking for basic information
concerning company structure, names and addresses of officers and names of subsidiary companies, the questionnaire requests specific information in the marketing and product promotion areas. General categories of information sought include dollar sales of certain drug
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it is estimated that approximately 700 such questionnaires have been sent out.'0
One of the reasons for the new type of investigation, as mentioned above, is
to insure equal treatment of all business organizations similarly situated in the enforcement of the various statutes (notably Robinson-Patman) which the FTC administers."' The nature of antitrust law and the rapid pace set by the huge corporate firms that predominate in our present economic society make necessary an
extensive backlog of related information to deal with the intricate trade regulation
problems and the myriad number of violations as they arise.
A second reason, made necessary by the amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, has been advanced. 12 The amended section deals with corporate acquisitions
and mergers, proscribing such acquisition of
the whole or any part of the assets . ..of another corporation also engaged

in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.' s
It is self-evident that the Commission must have adequate information to determine
what the "relevant market" is, who the producers are and what their respective
percentages of the market are in order to determine whether such mergers or acquisitions may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.' 4
The extended use of the FTC Act's investigatory power, already characterized
as the "broadest power available to any agency of the government' s has naturally
caused some concern among the corporate bar and antitrust defenders. Former
Commission Chairman Kintner has promised that, "The Commission has no intention of using this power as a means of harassment or to conduct mere fishing
expeditions.'1 6 Despite this- reassurance, it has been stated that the new technique's
success will rest upon the manner of its use, not on its effectiveness: "[I]f a short-cutminded complaint counsel runs wild,
it is likely that the ghost of the 1924 American
7
Tobacco decision will walk again."'
It is the purpose of this note to analyze the new investigation method used by
the FTC with emphasis on the limitations of such power as past courts have applied
them and to examine current complaints about the use of this power.
products, such as narcotics, and detailed information regarding prescription drug packaging
and labeling.

A general breakdown of the sales force is requested along with company customers pricing structures, and the details of transactions with customers in five selected trading areas.
The following request in regard to product promotion is reprinted from the questionnaire to
give some idea of the breadth of the inquiry.
XIII
For the period January 1, 1960 to date, furnish a copy covering each type
of advertisement published or disseminated, such as leaflets, brochures,
pamphlets, professional journal advertisements, tear sheets, posters, cartoons, articles, drawings, prints of speeches, radio scripts and television
scripts (together with a copy of the filmed commercial) used or disseminated in connection with the sale, promotion or introduction of any and
all of the prescription drugs and drug products listed in response to V,
which mentions or advises of the claimed therapeutic effect, symptomatic
relief, or of the side effects, of such prescription drugs and drug products.
Reports to be filed with the Federal Trade Commission by 37 Drug Companies, July 13, 1961.
10 Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to the NOTRE DAmE LAwYmR, August
17, 1961, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
11 The FTC administers and draws its powers from 14 statutes listed at 1960 FTC ANN.
REP. 99.
12 Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to the NoTR DAME LAwYER, September
1, 1961, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
13 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
14 For an analysis of recent activity pursuant to Section 7, see generally Clark, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 255 (1961).
15 Babcock, Legal Investigation, ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, 386 (1958).
16 Kintner, supra note 5, at 393.
17 Loughlin, Developments Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 419,
428-29 (1960).

NOTES
The Federal Trade Commission Act

In order to consider the FTC Act and Section 6, it is necessary to discuss the
Act in the light of its historical perspective.
The huge concentration of power in the hands of a few business magnates
during the latter tages of the 19th century became an issue of public concern.
Even the extreme laissez-faire theorist was ready to concede that the principles of
free interplay propounded by Adam Smith had little chance of surviving. Government intervention of some sort was inevitable.
As Van Cise points out, three alternatives presented themselves: first, the course
of eliminating private restraints by confiscation of private business interests; second,
the alternative of eliminating private restraints by eliminating the freedom of private
business through regulation; and third, the course finally adopted by the United
States, elimination of private restraints themselves through the antitrust laws.28
The first attempt by Congress to intervene in business found expression in the
Interstate Commerce Act, 19 which set up a commission to administer government
control over certain predatory business practices in the transportation industry. As
the common progenitor of subsequent administrative agencies, including the FTC,
the Interstate Commerce Commission serves as a valuable study of the attitudes,
judicial, legislative and popular, that were prevalent at the time.
Section 20 of the Act2 empowered the ICC to require annual reports from
carriers. From the beginning the Commission found that these reports were not
adequate to permit effective performance of its duties, and the annual reports filed
with Congress are replete with requests for extended investigative powers.2 1 In
1906, Congress responded to these pleas by an amendment which authorized the
Commission "to require such carriers to file monthly
22 reports of earnings and -expenses or special reports within a specified period."
The amendment of 1906 was assailed on many sides for a variety of reasons.
The courts, especially, were unable to accept such a powerful grant of authority
in a form not known to the common law. One authority has explained the judicial
attitude as follows,
Courts are not unconscious of the fact that, due to their own inadequacies,
areas of government formerly within their control have been handed over
to administrative agencies for supervision. . . . Thus, under the guise of
constitutional and statutory interpretation, efforts
23 to thwart the effects
of those legislative judgments are not uncommon.

Another factor that probably weighed heavily in the controversy was that Justice
Holmes, who once characterized antitrust law as "humbug based on economic
ignorance and incompetence," 24 was on the Supreme Court at that time. From
18 Van Cise, The Problems and Procedures of Counsel in Advising On Compliance with

the Antitrust Laws, 5

ANTITRUST

BULL. 221, 222 (1960).

19 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
20 24 Stat. 386 (1887).
21 See, e.g., 1890 ICC ANN. RmEP. 69; 1898 ICC ANN. REP. 79.
22 34 Stat. 593 (1908).
23 LANDis, THE ADmmiSTRATIvE PRocess, 122 (1938). The striking dichotomy in
judicial attitudes between the early Sherman Act era and the present time may be observed
in the following two quotations.
The judicial administrators of the competitive principles of our antitrust
laws, however, included in the days of our fathers many ardent converts
to a great and abiding faith, namely faith in business. An initial two
decades of trial and error in construing these laws had persuaded influential
judicial spokesmen that he governs best who governs industry least. VAN
CISE, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 45 (1958).
Although the administrative process has had a different development
and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they are to
be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate
independance of each should be respected by the other. United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1940).
24 Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Baron Pollock, 1 POLLOCK-HOLMES LETTERS 163
(1942).
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this, it is clear that the radically new methods of regulation were bound to get more
than superficial scrutiny by the judiciary. As the antitrust laws generally and the
administrative power' of investigation in particular are dependent on the courts
for enforcement, a favorable judicial attitude is the most important single. element
in determining their effectiveness. As will become apparent after an analysis of
relevant case law, "[T]he swing of the judicial pendulum . . . has carried
our anti' 25
trust laws first to a business right and then to a government left"
The validity of the amendment to Section 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act
was tested in Harriman v. ICC,2 6 a case in which the Commission had subpoenaed
a corporate officer to testify and produce documentary evidence on which the
Commission hoped to recommend legislation. Justice Holmes, writing for the ma
jority, said,
[]he power to require testimony is limited,, as it usually is in English
speaking countries, at least, to only the cases where the sacrifice of privacy
is necessary,
- those where the investigations concern a specific breach of
27
the law.
Continuing, Justice Holmes stated that only "explicit and unmistakable 2 words
by Congress will create such a power.
Aided by this indication that the Supreme Court would tolerate only the most

precise language in such a powerful grant of authority, Congress in 1910 articulated
such a grant. 29 Under authority of the 1910 amendment, the ICC, pursuant to
a Senate resolution, undertook an investigation of political contributions by members of the railroad industry. In Smith v. ICC,30 the investigation was challenged
on the basis of Harriman.The Court said, "Appellant, presses that case beyond its

principle. And we may observe that § 13 has been amended and broadened since
the decision in that case."'" Thus armed with an idea of the success of the Interstate Commerce Act amendment, and a need for increasing coverage of the antitrust laws, Congress put broad investigatory power in the hands of the new Federal
Trade Commission.
The FTC Act 32 was the first general antitrust statute which created an organic
Commission of qualified personnel to deal with the diverse number of possible
trade irregularities as defined by Section 5 of the Act. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are

declared unlawful."33 The generality of this statement is indicative of the broad
area of inquiry that Congress wished to delegate to the FTC. "The substantive
content of the phrase 'unfair methods of competition' was deliberately left undefined
by Congress, in order to 34leave wide latitude for checking new and varied forms
of monopolistic practices."
Section 6 of the Act confers the general investigatory power. Subsection
(a) provides that "the Commission shall have power to gather and compile information . . . and to investigate . . . the organization, business, conduct . . . of

any corporation engaged in commerce."3 5 The following subsection, 6(b), provides
that business associations shall:
file with the Commission in such form as the Commission may prescribe
annual or special, or3 6both annual and special reports or answers in writing

to specific questions.

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
as an
35
36

CISE, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 62 (1958).
211 U.S. 407 (1908).
Id. at 419.
Id. at 421.
36 Stat. 551 (1910).
245 U.S. 33 (1917).
Id. at 44.
38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Antitrust Law, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 163 (1960).
38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(a).
38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(b).
VAN

NOTES
Section 9 of the Act provides, among other things, that, (1) the Commission have "at all reasonable times" access to and the right to copy any docu-mentary evidence of a -corporation- being investigated, and (2) the FTC shall have
the subpoena power to compel testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant records. The Commission3 7 -may not enforce its own subpoenas but must .go
to the appropriate district court.
Section 10 of the Act contains a provision dealing with penalties for failure
to comply with legitimate FTC requests 38 The penalties are significant and have
ranged as high as $80,000.39
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 40 the FTC has promulgated
certain rules of practice 4' concerning all phases 'of the Commission's activities.
The rules were revised in 1960, and provide a great deal of information to those
subject to the FTC's jurisdiction relating to practical steps to be taken in dealing with the Commission.
Subpart D of the rules begins with a statement of investigation policy, urging
42
cooperation but warning "of the compulsory processes authorized by law.1
Section 1.33 provides that "[A]ny party under investigation compelled to
furnish information or documentary evidence shall be advised with respect to
the purpose and scope of the investigation." 43
Other parts of Subpart D deal with specific procedures and policies relating
to investigatory proceedings, articulating the FTC
Act as it has been interpreted
44
and applied by the courts and the Commission.
The Federal Reports Act of 194245 also affects Section 6(b) and the questionnaire method of investigation. Section 139(c) requires that whenever a'federal
agency submits more than ten questionnaires in identical form to business organizations, the forms must first be cleared through the Bureau of the Budget. This
Act was passed to avoid harassment of business and duplicity of effort on the
part of government agencies.48 The position of the Commission in regard to the
Federal Reports Act and the current questionnaire investigation is likely to be
the object of some controversy. The FTC readily admits that the Act applies to
general economic surveys which seek statistical information, but takes the position
that the current investigations are analagous to field investigations and that approval from the Bureau of the Budget is unnecessary. It is argued that the Budget
Bureau usually consults with industry representatives in evaluating the form and
content of the questionnaires and that this would put the Commission in the
47
anomalous position of having to solicit the approval of the people investigated.
While this argument has merit, the fact remains that this position collides with
the policy of the Federal Reports Act. Congress intended to alleviate the burden
on private industry which is entailed in compilation of large amounts of data.
The fact that the questionnaires are being used- for a different purpose does not
make this burden any less apparent. For this reason, it is possible that a challenge
on these grounds may be sustained. This difficulty might be surmounted, however, by a change in the policy of the Bureau of the Budget in regard to the new
questionnaire method. Specifically, the Bureau could take the position, as urged
37 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49(b).

38 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 50.
39 Hoffman, Meeting Antitrust Investigations, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 293, 303-04 (1958).
40 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11.
41 16 C.F.R. Chap. 1 (1960).
42 Id. at 1.31.
43 Id. at 1.33.
44 Id. at §§ 1.31-1.42.
45 56 Stat. 1079 (1942), 5 U.S.C. § 139(c).
46 Id. at § 139.
47 Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to the NOTRE DAME LAWYER, November
29, 1961, on file in the Notre Dame Law Library.
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by the FTC that the reports are not questionnaires within the meaning of the
Federal Reporis Act.
Any isolated analysis of a particular provision of the FTC Act is difficult because the Act itself is not an isolated piece of legislation but rather a part of our
general antitrust law. 48 It may be said in general that the FTC Act, with its broad
provisions, supplemented the Sherman Act and acted as a base around which
the more specific provisions of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts could be
enforced.
The Arguments Against Section 6 (b)
An article entitled "Mail-Order Prosecution: Who's Next?" appeared recently
in NATION'S BuSINESS 49 in connection with the industry-wide investigations. As
the title implies, business is greatly concerned with the newly exercised power that
the FTC claims, an attitude that has attended administative investigations since
their inception.
One of the most frequent attacks on the administrative inquiry that has been
raised through the years is that such process is a search and seizure prohibited by
the fourth amendment.
The earlier cases, reflecting a more restrictive attitude on the part of the
courts, frequently disallowed an inquiry because of excessive breadth. In Hale v.
Henkel,5" the defendant, a corporate officer, had been directed by a Grand Jury
to appear and produce an enormous list of papers, without any indication as to
the materiality of the various classes of records sought. The Court held that the
subpoena was "far too sweeping in its terms ' 51 and that some averment as to the
relevance of the particular classes or records sought must be made before such
an order could be sustained.
Perhaps the most familiar case on search and seizure in this context is FTC
v. American Tobacco Company.52 In consequence of a number of complaints filed
with the Commission, American Tobacco was ordered to produce a vast number
of documents in the form of letters, telegrams, contracts and other related material. After the company refused to comply, the Commission went to court to
enforce the subpoena. The decision, for the defendant corporation, was based
on the relatively narrow issue of whether the FTC had the claimed "unlimited
right of access to the respondent's papers . . . . ,M In light of the claim, the holding is not surprising. Stronger language in the opinion, written by Justice Holmes,
however, has made this case significant.
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of
its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire ... and to
direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they
48 The Supreme Court was called upon in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632 (1950), to determine whether Sections 5 and 6 of the Act were separate and distinct
(Morton contended that the Section 6 reports could be required only in support of general
economic surveys and not in aid of enforcement proceedings under Section 5), or whether
they were to be considered in pari materia as part of an integrated antitrust law. The Court
said (at 649):
While we find a good deal which would warrant our concluding that
§ 6 was framed with the pre-existing antitrust laws in mind, and in the
expectation that information procured would be chiefly useful in reports
to the President, the Congress, or the Attorney General, we find nothing
that would deny its use for any purpose within the duties of the Commission, including a § 5 proceeding.
This doctrine was recently restated and followed in United States v. St. Regis Paper Co.,

285 F.2d 607, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1960).
49
50
51

NATiONs BusIN-SS, July, 1961, p. 34.
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Id. at 76.

52 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
53 Id. at 305.

NOTES
may disclose evidence of crime. ... It is contrary to the first principles of
records, relevant or
justice to, allow a search through all the respondent's
54
irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up. 7

The holding in a case identical to American Tobacco would doubtless be the same
today.e5 The case has been distinguished so many times in recent years, however,
that the "fishing expedition" analogy has lost much of its vitality.
s
In 1945, the Supreme Court, in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
distinguished between "actual" and "constructive" searches and drew upon the
concept "rule of reason" which had long guided antitrust adjudication and procedure to construct standards which the administrative inquiry had to meet to
withstand attack on constitutional grounds. Referring to the requirement of reasonableness, the Court said: "This cannot be reduced to a formula; for relevancy
and adequacy or excess in the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in
57
relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry." This approach was
5s
rephrased and affirmed in United States v. Morton Salt Co., where Justice Jackson said, "It is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
59
demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant."
These general standards, adopted to lend some uniformity to a complex issue,
where each case must turn on its facts, obtain today as guides.
As Professor Davis points out, the judicial attitude since the Oklahoma Press
0
and Morton Salt cases has been one of deference to the administrative body. A
1
1956 case provides an example of this. In Herman v. CAB,6 the Ninth Circuit
said,
In order to have the subpoena enforced, the issue as to whether each of
the documents subpoenaed is relevant and material is a judicial question
which must be passed upon by the court. There are no presumptions that
has subpoenaed only those
the administrative agency or the hearing officer
2
documents which are relevant and material.
63
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, citing Oklahoma Press.
of
the FTC's Section 6(b)
the
use
made
to
been
have
Various objections
power and similar powers of other agencies, which all fall within the purview of
the fifth amendment.
The first of these objections is that such compulsory process violates the selfincrimination privilege of the fifth amendment. The first case asserting this privi64
lege against administrative inquirers was Boyd v. United States, a controversy instatute. The Surevenue
the
customs
under
powers
volving use of the subpoena
preme Court said:
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner
of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against 65himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.
As the administrative form of inquiry became more prevalent however, the
basic attitude of the courts began to change. Exceptions to the self-incrimination
privilege appeared. In 1906, the Supreme Court enunciated the first such exception, that corporations do not have the same status as a natural person for pur-

54 Id. at 305-06.
55 Loughlin, Investigation and Trial of Robinson-Patman Act Cases Before the Federal
Trade Commission, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 741, 761 (1959).
56 327 U.S. 186 (1945).
57 Id. at 209.
58 338 U.S. 632.
59 Id. at 652.
60 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 3.06 (1958).
61 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956).
62 Id. at 362.
63 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
64 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
65 Id. at 634-35.
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87
poses of the self-incrimination privilege.68 In Wilson v. United States,
five years
later, this holding was quoted with approval. The Court then went on to indicate
another exception to the privilege, holding that it did -not apply,

to records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established.6 8

A legislative provision removing a reason for the self-incrimination privilege
appears in Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act:
But no natural person shall be prosecuted . . . on account of any transaction . . . concerning which he may testify . . . before the commission

in obedience to a subpoena issued by it.69
This device was first utilized in connection with the Interstate Commerce Act in
1893.70 Its constitutionality was upheld in subsequent litigation 71 and has been included in this type of legislation consistently.72 Two fairly recent cases have been
resolved which are consistent with the judicial trend of generally extending the
investigatory power. In United States v. White,73 the Supreme Court extended the
corporate exception to include also non-corporate economic societies:
The framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure, who were interested primarily in protecting individual civil liberties,
cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be available to protect
economic or other interests
74 of such organizations so as to nullify appropriate
governmental regulations.
In the second case, Shapiro v. United States7 5 a 5-4 Court held that the immunity
provision cannot be
invoked where the records to be disclosed are those required
6
by law to be kept.7
A second argument based on the fifth amendment is that delegation of the
subpoena power in the absence of adjudication or probable cause amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process.
The economic and social structure in the days before "big business" was of
such a relatively simple nature that the necessity of administrative inquiry and the
administrative subpoena power as a means of putting some substance to the inquiry were non-existent. With this in mind, the holding of an 1887 case is not
surprising: "[F]orcible intrusion into, and compulsory exposure of, one's private
affairs and papers, . . . is contrary to the instincts of a free government. . . . 7
. Considered within the framework of the society in which Judge Field uttered
it, the above dictum is perfectly reasonable. This attitude, however, carried over
into a period when the administrative inquiry was, increasingly, becoming recognized as a necessary tool in abolishing certain predatory business practices in restraint of competition.
In 1908, pursuant to its powers under the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC
conducted an investigation of the activities of railroads for the purpose of recommending legislation. In Harriman v. United States,"' a case which arose out of

66 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
67 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
68 Id. at 380.
69 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49.
70 27 S'tat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 6. (Commonly referred to as the Compulsory Testimony Act.)
71 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
72 A footnote in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6, n.4 (1948), gives an extensive list of statutes in which the immunity proviso appears.
73 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
74 Id. at 700.
75

Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1.

76 Id. at 16.
77 In Re Pacific Railway Comm'n, 32 Fed. 241, 251 (C.C.N.D. 1887).
78 211 U.S. 407 (1907).
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that investigation, the power of compulsory production of evidence was challenged.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, said:
[T]he purposes of the act for which the commission may exact evidence
embrace only complaints for violations of the act, and investigations by the
commission upon matters that might have been made the object of complaint.79
There was never a definite pronouncement by the Court that the Harriman
dictum had been abandoned. Even that case did not expressly overrule delegation
of the subpoena power but merely held Congress did not intend such a delegation.80 The attitude of that Court, however, is effectively expressed in the result,
regardless of how that result was reached.
Several factors intervened, however, to change the judicial attitude toward
delegation of the subpoena power. The practicalities of ordering a huge, expanding
economic complex, the interplay and gradual displacement of economic and social
theories,8' and the insistence of Congress on delegating the subpoena power were
significant among these forces, which eventuated in the Supreme Court's pronouncement in 1946 that
It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or

complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pur-

suant to one ....
The requirement of "probable cause supported by oath
or, affirmation," literally applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied
in that . . . the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose
82
Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.

The Court seemed to go even further in the Morton Salt case.
Even ifone were to regard the [FTC's] request for information in this case
as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevetheless, law-enforcing

agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves83 that corporate behavior
is consistent with the law and the public interest.

The ideas and attitudes expressed in these cases apply today and are in no
danger of being overturned.8 4 More interesting questions that have arisen recently
in connection with the power to compel testimony and the production of documentary evidence involve the utilization of the investigatory power to obtain evidence of trade irregularities against, third parties with whom thes5 investigated
party has dealt. In two separate cases, this power has been upheld.

Another recent development in this area arose with a 1961 case, St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States."" The petitioner contended that specific questions within the questionnaire were vague and unreasonable and therefore violative of due
process. Under the doctrine of the FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.87 case, it was argued
that the validity of the Commission's request could not be tested until the FTC
brought an action on the penalties for refusal. Therefore defendant could (1)
spend money on an investigation he claimed illegal, or (2) permit ruinous penalties to accumulate with the attendant risk that the enforcing court may adjudge
the questions reasonable.
In answer, the Court distinguished Claire Furnace, saying that in that case,
an action was not brought by the FTC as was the case here, and that petitioner
could have applied for a stay on the penalties.88 The Court also noted that the
79

Id. at 419-20.

80 Id. at 419.
81 See Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation in the Supreme Court, 33 NOTRE DAhZE
LAWYER 5 (1957).

82 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1945).
83 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652.
84 See Davis supra note 61, § 3.06. See generally id. §§ 3.01-3.14.
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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Declaratory Judgment Act was not available during the Claire Furnace period,
intimating that under the Act, the validity of a specific order may be tested. 9
Present State of the Law
Potential litigants desiring to escape the tendrils of Section 6(b) of the FTC
Act are, as we have seen, at a distinct disadvantage. The 1940's saw a great deal
of change in the law regarding administrative inquiries and all the changes were
in favor of the power. The Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt cases have set up
broad bases upon which the agency may rest its power.
The test in regard to search and seizure requirements is one of reasonableness, controlled by two elements: breadth and relevance. By adopting programs
broad in their scope to realistically deal with correspondingly broad and complex
antitrust problems, the FTC has affirmatively determined what is relevant and
how extensive the investigations may permissably be.
Shifting then to the program that the Commission selects, how much discretion will they be allowed to use? The Court's general attitude may be learned from
Moog v. FTC90 where the Court said: "If the commission has decided the question, its discretionary determination should not be overturned in the absence of
a patent abuse of discretion." 9 This patent abuse of discretion, then, is the point
where the Court will draw the line. 92 At the present time, it appears that the FTC's
power, though used vigorously, has been used judiciously.
Restrictions as to self-incrimination do not seriously hamper Commission activities at the present time. Corporations and other economic associations have
been denied the privilege and individuals are now protected by immunity statutes.
Arguments based on the validity of exercising the subpoena power in the
absence of probable cause have also been overruled. The Oklahoma Press and
Morton Salt cases have affirmed this power, once at issue, and later cases have
cemented the current position.
As stated above, however, the Section 6 power is not without restrictions.
Patent abuse of discretion by the Commission in selecting improper and unauthorized objectives will disqualify the inquiry. Even pursuant to an inquiry that
is authorized, questions that are irrelevant to this purpose or that tend to put
an unreasonable burden on the party investigated may well be declared unenforceable. It is significant to note here that under St. Regis, the investigated company can now test the validity of the questionnaire. The lower court held that
twelve per cent of the questions were too vague and did not have to be answered 3
The Commission won an appeal on other grounds, so arguably, they did not question the validity of this holding. The rules of procedure and the Federal Reports
Act provide other technical safeguards and guides for the protection of those subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Complete and thorough familiarity with these
rules and the statutes as they have been interpreted is the most certain safeguard.
It is to be noted, fcr example, that parties who respond voluntarily to the questionnaires will probably not be allowed to claim the Section 9 immunity, inasmuch
89 Ibid.
90 355 U.S. 411 (1957).
91
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92 Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, said, at 652,
Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be
of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under
inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power ... We are not to be
understood as holding such orders exempt from judicial examination or
as extending a license to exact as reports what would not be reasonably
contemplated within that term as used by Congress in the context of
this act.
93 United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 181 F. Supp. 862, 868.

NOTES
as the questionnaires are sent out under authority of Section 6 rather than the
subpoena authority of section 9.94
Although the new method of investigation by the FTC is yet experimental,
it has been used in almost 700 cases and, aside from one challenge on procedural
grounds, 95 has not been contested by the companies on which it has been used.
The advantages of the new method are impressive. Most important, it provides a
method of applying, equitably, laws such as the Robinson-Patman Act, thereby
circumventing the difficulty that arose in the Moog and Niehoff cases. Secondly,
the new method is economical. On the FTC's side, it eliminates investigation by
organic FTC personnel, the problems of excessive travel, and increases the productivity of the FTC budgeted tax dollar. On business' side, it frees busy executives from traveling to hearings and giving testimony.
One obstacle that many companies have complained about is the excessive
cost of conducting the questionnaire investigation. 96 The short answer to this, of
course, is that regulation is one of the costs of doing business today. More in line
with the general attitude of cooperation and compliance that both sides of the
antitrust bar urge today, it would seem that more consideration should be given
to this problem and attempts made to alleviate it. A possible solution may lie in
a standardization of records by way of coordinating the answers that government
wants with the figures that business uses in ordering the affairs of the company.
As has been said above, the new method of investigation is not yet old
enough to permit detached observation and evaluation. Once restrictive constitutional barriers of the Holmes era have now given way to an attitude of judicial
deference. On the basis of this, the new method does not at the present time face
a severe test. The courts have at times, however, implied that if ever the inquiry
grew unreasonable, they would not be unwilling to step in. To date, this prerogative has not been exercised by the Supreme Court. But if at any time the abuse
of discretion becomes apparent, such abuse will render the inquiry a nullity.
Dennis R. Powell

94 Sherwin v. United States, 268 U.S. 369 (1924); cf. Cannan v. United States, 19
F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1927).
95 Armour & Co. challenged the .questionnaire report on several procedural grounds,
maintaining that they are subject to the Department of Agriculture, under the Packers and

Stockyards Act, rather than the FTC. 23 FDC Reports, August 28, 1961.
.96 Armour estimated that the cost of the investigation would run as high as $100,000.

23 FDC Reports, August 28, 1961.

